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The flexicurity approach claims a positive effect of flexible labour on firm 
performance, also through an increased ability to innovate. Critics consider it a 
deregulation of the labour market, decreasing investment in human capital and innovation. 
We contribute to this broad debate providing an estimate of the relationships linking 
innovative investment, substitution investment, permanent hires and temporary hires. In 
particular, we aim at affirming or denying that innovative investments are accompanied by 
a specific kind of workforce, being it stable or flexible. In doing so, we contribute to bridge 
the gap among two quite separate strands of literature, as existing literature usually 
analyses capital and labour separately.  
Estimating a non linear recursive equation system we highlight a significant increase 
in the likelihood of hiring on a permanent base when the firm innovates; this holds till 
2008. Afterward, during the crisis, innovating firms are more likely to hire using temporary 
contracts instead, a possible signal of  a cost saving strategy adopted in a loose labour 
market. Furthermore, both permanent and temporary hires never depend on increases in 
labour costs; however, substitution investment increases when labour cost increases, 
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In the last two decades, the European debate on economic growth and 
competitiveness on the global markets has been shaped by – among other things - 
the so-called “flexicurity approach”, i.e. by the aim to make European labour markets 
more flexible and at the same time to provide workers with a safety net against 
unemployment and human capital obsolescence. Supporters of flexicurity assert a 
positive effect of flexible labour
1 on firm performance; a better performance can be 
due to a decrease in labour cost as such or to an enhanced ability to innovate and 
increase productivity at the firm level. On the other hand, its critics emphasize the 
risk associated to a rise in temporary employment, that could decrease investment 
in human capital and hence innovation, performance and competitiveness in the 
longer run.  
The link between hiring strategy and the ability to innovate products and/or 
production processes at the firm level is then crucial. However, existing literature 
usually analyses production factors separately, e.g. labour literature concentrates on 
the effect of temporary contracts on workers’ career and on their productivity and 
training; investment literature focuses on lumpiness and aggregation issues or on 
investors’ choice among innovative and non-innovative investment. In this sense, 
the interaction between different kinds of investment (more or less innovative) and 
different kinds of labour contracts (more or less flexible) at the firm level is often 
neglected, also due to the lack of suitable data.  
The main innovation of this paper is that of contributing to bridge the gap 
between the two strands of literature, providing new insights into the degree of 
complementarity or substitutability at the firm level between different kinds of 
investment (that we label substitution and innovation) and different kinds of labour 
                                                  
1 The term flexible labour here is referred to the various forms of temporary contracts.  3 
hires (labelled temporary and permanent). We depict a sequential set of decisions 
on production factors the firm has to make every period, and we allow for 
observable and unobservable elements connecting them. In particular we identify 
the impact of having invested in innovative capital on the likelihood of hiring new 
workers with a permanent and/or with a temporary contract. Causal interpretation 
hinges on the specification of the model and on the ability to control for 
unobservables (section 5 discusses the point thoroughly). However, even a cautious 
interpretation of our results supplies important elements of reflection to the issue at 
stake. In fact, measuring if and to what extent capital innovation and labour flexibility 
are correlated – in a general sense - is crucial. It is the first but unavoidable step to 
understand whether the sharp turn toward labour market deregulation we have 
witnessed in Europe has been accompanied by an increased ability on the side of 
firms to compete on technologically advanced markets. 
The focus of our paper is on the Italian manufacturing sector; Italy is indeed a 
case of special interest: in fact, Italian labour market institutions have dramatically 
changed since the nineties, with a sharp reduction of EPL for new hires
2. Our main 
finding is the following. Fitting a non linear recursive equation system we estimate a 
significant increase in the likelihood of hiring on a permanent base when the firm 
innovates; this holds till 2008. Afterward, during the crisis, innovating firms are more 
likely to hire using temporary contracts instead. A possible explanation points to a 
cyclical element in this pattern, i.e. in upturns investment in physical and human 
capital go together, while in (sharp) downturns it emerges a cost saving strategy 
adopted by firms still able to innovate; strategy that is viable because the labour 
market is very loose, and in this sense it would represent an exception to the 
general rule matching innovative investment to a stable labour force. However, to be 
more definite on this statement we will need to wait for the development of this 
                                                  
2 See for example Mancini (2007). 4 
pattern not only in the aftermath of the crisis that we are still experiencing (our last 
data point is very up to date, being December 2010) but also later on.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the related literature, 
section 3 introduces the ISAE/ISTAT
3 survey on manufacturing firms; section 4 
provides descriptive evidence on hires and investments. The theoretical model we 
refer to, as well as the econometric approach are described in section 5. Results are 
discussed in section 6. Some consideration on the results obtained will conclude the 
paper.  
 
2. Overview of the literature  
From a theoretical standpoint, the effects of the adoption of flexible labour 
contracts on firms’ productivity are ambiguous. Large part of the economic literature 
in the ‘90s and early 2000s (see De Graaf-zijl, 2006 for a survey) states that 
flexibility allows firms to adapt more rapidly to fluctuations of demand, possibly 
increasing marginal efficiency and determining productivity gains via a reduction of 
labour hoarding. The human resource managerial literature challenged this vision 
(Hailey, 2001 for a survey), underlying that a high turnover of employees hinders the 
development of new ideas and hence of innovation. Storey et al (2002) add to this 
general statement documenting that employees are willing to provide discretionary 
effort and to accept the risk involved into innovative activity only if they feel secure in 
their employment relationship. Furthermore, they show that employees directly 
involved in innovative activity are “far less subject” to flexible employment contracts 
while if this is not the case the degree of innovativeness is lower; however, a flexible 
labour force employed in non-innovative activities can enhance the firm’s innovative 
                                                  
3 The Institute of Studies and Economic Analyses (ISAE) has been responsible for carrying out the survey until 
December, 2010. Starting from January 1, 2011, ISAE activities have been transferred to ISTAT, that is now 
in charge of the survey. 5 
performance. According to a more recent strand of economic literature, the use of 
flexible and temporary contracts may also reduce both the incentives for firms to 
invest in training and those for the workers to apply greater effort in order to acquire 
new skills; both consequences will have a negative effect on overall labour 
productivity and possibly also on TFP (e.g. Brandolini and Bugamelli, 2009). 
Moreover, according to Daveri and Parisi (2010), temporary contracts may 
negatively affect productivity also because the latter is positively related to 
experience, and flexible workers are on average less experienced than those 
holding an open ended job. MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007) show that when 
employment protection legislation becomes more stringent employment increases in 
occupations that imply high levels of skill and specific human capital investment; the 
opposite happens for low skill occupations. 
A very recent spur of literature adds to this debate focussing directly on the link 
between flexible employment contracts and innovation at the firm level. Acharya et 
al (2010a)’s model shows that “stringent labour laws can provide firms a 
commitment device to not punish short-run failures and thereby spur their 
employees to pursue value-enhancing innovative activities”. In Acharya et al 
(2010a), and also in a companion paper in which they apply a different empirical 
approach (Acharya et al, 2010b), they estimate that “innovation and economic 
growth are fostered by stringent laws governing dismissal of employees, especially 
in the more innovation-intensive sectors”. A related work by Acharya et al (2010c) 
models the internal governance of firms, pointing to the positive effect of their long 
term commitment with subordinates in enhancing investment.  
Albeit the relationship between flexibility and productivity is a highly debated 
issue, a positive effect of innovation on productivity growth is usually well 
documented by the data. Focussing on Italy, Parisi, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 
(2006) find that the effect is particularly strong for process innovation; similarly, 6 
Pianta and Vaona (2007) show that the reduction in capital deepening occurred in 
Italy in the first decade of the new century, that has been associated with a 
reduction of R&D and human capital expenditures, has contributed to explain the 
observed reduction in productivity. A similar effect of product innovation is found by 
Bugamelli, Schivardi and Zizza (2008), according to whom firms that are able to 
innovate their basket of products are also those experiencing higher growth of value 
added, profits and productivity. Similar results - based on a sample of firms 
extracted from ISAE archives - are found by De Nardis, Pappalardo and Vicarelli 
(2008). In this sense, the study of the relationship between labour market flexibility 
and innovation may ultimately help also to shed light on the more controversial issue 
concerning the relationship between flexibility and productivity growth. According to 
the existing empirical literature on Italy, the effect of labour market deregulation on 
firms’ efficiency and (labour or total) productivity is not totally clear-cut. According to 
Cipollone and Guelfi (2006) the increase in flexibility has been very effective in 
reducing labour costs and hence stimulate employment growth. However, 
employment increases have been also associated with a reduction of both labour 
productivity and TFP (Lucidi, 2006)
4. Similarly, Bassanetti, Dopke, Torrini and Zizza 
(2006) find that labour market reforms and wage moderation have favoured a 
process of substitution of capital with labour, inducing a slowdown in accumulation 
activity and limiting its support for growth. On the other hand, according to Boeri and 
Garibaldi (2007) the reduction in productivity associated with the adoption of more 
flexible labour market institutions should be considered as temporary; similar 
conclusions are reached by De Nardis (2007), according to whom new labour 
market institutions have favoured the adoption of more labour intensive production 
techniques, that in the short run may have had a negative effect on productivity, but 
                                                  
4 This is consistent with Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008) on Europe as a whole and with Michie and Sheean (2003) 
for the UK. 7 
that may also result in an increase in firms’ efficiency and productivity on longer time 
horizon. 
We add to this literature focussing on a very recent period (up to December 
2010), using the new and unique dataset of manufacturing firms described in section 
3; we estimate directly the link between innovative investment and flexible contracts, 
and we also analyse how this link evolves over the current - and very special - 
business cycle.  
 
3.  The ISAE/ISTAT survey and the dataset  
The dataset used in this paper links firm characteristics to hiring and 
investment data and it is extracted from the ISAE/ISTAT survey on manufacturing 
firms. More specifically the survey provides monthly data about the current 
economic condition of the firm and its expectations; it also contains two special 
sections on investments and hiring decisions. The joint consideration of the monthly 
information and of the two special sections represents a unique source of data on 
capital, labour, production and demand at the firm level. 
The ISAE/ISTAT survey is performed monthly as part of the Joint Harmonised 
Business and Consumers Survey (BCS) program of the European Commission
5. 
The statistical unit considered for the survey is the firm. Referring to the Universe of 
all firms operating in the Class C of the new NaceRev.2 Classification (540,000 
firms), the BCS program targets firms with at least 10 employees (91,600 units). 
From this frame list a sample of 4,000 firms is extracted, hence representing 4.4% of 
the actual frame units. The sample is stratified along 3 axes, namely industry, 
macro-region and size of the firms; the method used for extracting the sample is the 
optimal allocation to strata, in which strata characterised by an higher internal 
variability are over-sampled with respect to those with a lower variability (Chiodini et 
                                                  
5  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm 8 
al, 2009). The sample is treated as a panel, i.e. firms are re-interviewed each month, 
gradually substituting drop-offs with new firms extracted with similar criteria. The 
survey method is mixed, allowing for both telephone interviews supported by CATI 
system (80%) and Fax interviews (20%); emails are also used for a selected 
subsample of – mostly large - firms. The use of CATI and fax allows to reach a very 
high average response rate, that is currently around 95% of the target sample. 
Business tendency surveys generally collect entrepreneurs’ and managers’ 
opinions on current trends and expectations for the near future, regarding both their 
own business and the general situation of the economy. Information is of a 
qualitative type, in the sense that respondents do not report quantitative data (e.g. 
the amount of production in one month), but qualitative, multiple-choice 
assessments on the behaviour of a variable (e.g. if production has increased, 
decreased or remained the same in a given month with respect to the previous one). 
Firms are asked to report about both the current situation of a given variable and 
their short-term forecasts on possible outcomes in the near future (usually three 
months ahead). In the case of the manufacturing survey, the monthly questionnaire 
includes qualitative information about current and expected level of production and 
demand, inventories of finished products, employment, liquidity constraints. On a 
quarterly basis, the survey alternatively adds questions about plant utilisation, 
working hours, export activity, and the firm’ assessment about the competitive 
position of the firm. In the following we describe in more detail the two special 
sections on investment and hiring decisions. 
 
3.1 The investment section 
The investment section uses the same sample adopted for the general monthly 
survey. It is performed twice a year in the months of March and October (Cesaroni, 
Malgarini, Rocchetti, 2005). Survey method for this special section has changed 9 
during the years, with a considerable impact on average response rates: initially, it 
was performed via mail, and response rates were about 20% of the target sample of 
4,000 firms. Since 2006, ISAE adopted a mixed mode technique, confirming the use 
of the mail mode for previously-responding firms and combining it with CATI and fax 
methods in order to obtain responses from “reluctant” units. Mixed mode resulted in 
an increase of the response rate to around 70% of the target sample. Starting from 
2009, the survey has been entirely conducted with CATI and Fax methods, and as a 
result response rates increased to almost 95% of the target sample.   
This questionnaire’s section provides an estimate of the structure of investment 
expenditures and of their rate of growth; besides, it also provides qualitative 
information on the factors eventually influencing a revision of the investment plan 
during the year. It records investment in three consecutive years: investments of the 
two previous years and of the current one in the spring survey; investments of the 
previous, current and next year in the autumn survey. We make use of the October 
wave of the survey each year, and of the questions reporting investment on the 
same year. 
As for the structure of investment, firms report about the share of expenditures 
respectively devoted to substitute for existing capital, rationalise the production 
process or increase the production, whether of new or existing products. For the 
purpose of the present work, we label as “substitution” investment those attributed 
by firms to substitution of existing capital or other reasons (e.g. security); we label 
“process innovation” all investments due to rationalization, i.e. those aimed at 
automation, or at introducing new production techniques, or at power saving; we 
also consider in this category all investments linked to environmental concerns and 
also investments coded as increase production of existing products. We finally label 
“product innovation” investments coded as increase production of new products. We 10 
then consider two non mutually exclusive subgroups: “substitution” and “all 
innovative”.  
From the survey it is possible to recover the monetary amount of each kind of 
investment, given the total amount recorded and the declared shares in each kind of 
investment. However, these questions are among the few questions comprised in 
the survey reporting quantitative measures, and as such may be particularly subject 
to non response biases and to measurement errors; in particular, shares of total 
investment show a clear heaping at round numbers. For these reasons, we choose 
to use only qualitative information on the kind of investment activity, considering 
whether or not the firm has realised substitution and/or innovative investments.  
To give a flavour of the content of the survey, Table 1 shows the share of firms 
by kind of investment in the years of our analysis (2006-2010). Letting aside the 
expected decrease in investment when the crisis hits, the vast majority of 
investment is just a “substitution” of existing capital: 50% of investing firms in 2006 
perform only substitution investment; the percentage increases to 70% in 2010 after 
peaking to 80% in 2008. The share of firms that either do not invest or just substitute 
existing capital increases from about 70% in 2006 to almost 90% in 2010, so that 
different kinds of innovative investments involve about 30% of firms in 2006 and just 
one out of ten firms in 2010.  
The huge number of zeroes documented in table 1, i.e. no investment of any 
kind in the year, confirms the lumpy/inaction dynamics of capital, a fixed factor of 
production characterized by non convex adjustment costs (Caballero, 1999). In table 
2 we confirm that there is not only inaction but also persistence in investment activity 
over time
6. Firms that invested in the previous year are more likely to invest again in 
the current year, even though in 2010 the effect is much weakened with respect to 
2006 (down from 80% to 60% of those who invested in year t-1 invest again in year 
                                                  
6 For the sake of brevity, only two years are presented, reporting on two different points of the business cycle.  11 
t). The current investment is more likely to be aimed both at substitution and at 
innovation if the firm invested in the previous year. We will use this persistence as a 
control for firm general propensity to invest.  
More descriptive evidence will be provided in section 4. 
 
3.2 The labour market section 
Similarly to the investment section, also the labour market section (LMS) is 
performed on the same sample adopted for the general monthly survey on the 
manufacturing sector. It started in 2006
7 and it is carried out once a year, initially in 
the month of December, and since 2009 in January (reference period being 
respectively the current and the previous year). It uses a mixed mode, CATI/Fax 
technique; hence, response rates are in line with those obtained with the standard 
monthly survey. Differently from the general business tendency survey, LMS 
provides several quantitative data. More specifically, it provides information about 
the number of people recruited along the year by the firm, and their distribution by 
type of contract. Contracts are distinguished by different levels of employment 
protection: open ended contracts, fixed term contracts, temporary agency work, 
trainees, and other types of contracts allowed in the Italian institutional setting (see 
ISAE, 2007, for a complete description of the survey). The questionnaire contains 
also information on skills of the new entrants (the percentage of hires with a degree 
or more) and on the recruitment channels preferred by firms: informal network, 
public employment services, private agencies (e.g. temporary help work), or other 
institutions (school, universities). Since 2008, firms provide also data on the end-of-
year stock of employees by type of contract. Finally, starting from 2009, firms are 
also asked to report about the previous employment status of entrants, i.e. whether 
                                                  
7 This is the reason why our period of analysis begins in 2006. 12 
workers come from unemployment, from another firm or from the same firm with a 
different contract.  
Similarly to what has already been observed regarding the investment section 
of the survey, it should be considered that quantitative questions on hiring are 
among the few questions reporting quantitative measures that firms have to answer, 
and as such may be particularly subject to non response biases and measurement 
errors. For these reasons, we choose to use only qualitative information on hiring 
activity, considering whether or not the firm has hired using a given contract.  
Section 4 will provide more descriptive evidence on the survey; here in Table 3 
we consider whether the firm hires workers with different kinds of contracts. In 
general 80% (up to 90% in 2009) of those who hire do so using only one kind of 
contract: about 40% of firms use open ended contracts only, and another 30% uses 
fixed term contracts only; however for the first time in 2010 the share of firms hiring 
only with fixed term contracts overcomes the share of firms that hires only with open 
ended contracts. In 2006-2008 about 70% of firms did not hire workers, a 
percentage that jumps to 80% in 2009-2010; as a consequence, also in this case a 
huge number of zeroes, i.e. no hiring of any kind in the year, occurs. This inaction 
classifies also labour as a factor of production characterized by non convex 
adjustment costs
8.  
On the basis of these information, correspondingly to the investment definition, 
we then consider two non mutually exclusive subgroups: “permanent” and “all 
temporary” hiring. 
 
                                                  
8 Differently from the investment survey, in the labour market survey no retrospective questions about hires in the 
previous year are reported. This makes more difficult to check the persistence in hires, as matching two 
surveys at one year distance generates attrition problems in addition to those discussed in section 3.3. 13 
3.3 The merged dataset and selection issues 
We start matching the 2896 firms in the November 2006 investment survey 
and the 3816 firms in the December 2006 labour market survey obtaining exactly 
2700 matches (Table 4). This provides the endogenous variables on investment and 
hiring decisions. We then match the 2700 firms to their monthly questionnaires one 
year before, to obtain the exogenous determinants of the above decisions. After the 
match with the monthly questionnaires collected in December 2005 and in January 
2006 (3726 observations) we are left with 2272 firms (78.5% of the potential sample 
of 2896 firms). We then repeat the same for the following years, as reported in Table 
4. 
To check the absence of sample selection along observable characteristics of 
the firms we compare firms in the final sample and out of the final sample. 
Regarding the investment archive, mean and median firm size is unchanged in and 
out of the final sample, both within size classes, geographical areas, sectors, and 
overall. Conditional probability of being out of the final sample is marginally higher 
among small firms (under 15 employees) regardless of their investment decisions. 
Also regarding the labour market survey, mean and median firm size is unchanged, 
both within size classes, geographical areas, sectors and overall. Conditional 
probability of being out of the final sample is marginally higher among large firms 
(above 100 employees) regardless of their hiring decisions
9. 
Notice that even though the survey is built as a panel we use it as yearly cross 
sections, as attrition would decrease sample size significantly. In fact, despite the 
high response rate it is quite likely that firms skip one interview in the four we need 
each year to build the dataset (about 20% every year, Table 4). Extending this over 
time would require responses to at least 8 interviews in two consecutive years and it 
would decrease the responding firms to a non representative subset (we would lose 
                                                  
9 Results are available with the authors upon request. 14 
an additional 20% of firms every year, with a peak to 30% in 2009). This prevents 
the possibility of a dynamic specification of our model. 
We weight all statistics and estimates using data from the official archive of 
existing firms (ASIA), referred to the year 2007; i.e. from ASIA we compute the 
distribution of firms by 4 geographical areas, 3 size classes (cut points 15 and 100 
employees) and 15 manufacturing industries, and we weight our sample 
accordingly. 
Having merged the two surveys we can consider hiring and investment 
decisions jointly. Table 5 presents a simple cross tabulation of kinds of investment 
and kinds of hiring at the firm level
10. A large inaction does emerge; 32% of firms in 
2006 and 47% of firms in 2010 neither invest nor hire. In both years firms not hiring 
are less likely to invest and even less likely to perform an innovative investment. On 
the other hand, those who do not invest are less likely to hire. In other words there 
are hints of a positive correlation between investment and hiring activity at the firm 
level.  
 
4. Descriptive  evidence 
4.1 Hiring and Investment 
In this section, we separately analyse the characteristics of the firms that hire 
(whether on a permanent or temporary basis) and invest (whether substituting 
existing capital or innovating). Section 6 will then be dedicated to the joint estimate 
of the two investment and two hiring decisions.  
In the analysis, we consider a number of firm characteristics that we observe in 
the survey; this information is referred to the end of the year preceding hiring and 
investment decisions. More specifically, we use information regarding both the 
production process and the demand faced by the firm. The demand is approximated 
                                                  
10 For the sake of brevity, only two years are presented, reporting on two different points of the business cycle. 15 
by the firm’s assessment on the current level of orders, its competitive position and 
whether the firm exports a share of its production. To measure the level of 
production we consider the degree of plant utilisation (expressed in percentage of 
total capacity), the firm assessments on working hours, the existence of obstacles to 
increase production, liquidity constraints and the current level of production and 
inventories. Finally, we consider whether the cost of labour has increased – 
according to the firm – above or below a 3% threshold in the last 12 months.  
Table 6 reports on the year 2006
11. Firms making innovative investment are 
less likely to have reported a low level of demand the year before. They are also 
less likely to have faced obstacles to increase production, liquidity constraints, or a 
low production level. Non-investing firms, on the other hand, are less likely to have 
faced an increase in worked hours the year before. A past increase in the cost of 
labour is associated to substitution investment. Finally, the already noticed positive 
(unconditional) correlation between investment and hiring emerges again. 
Turning now to analyse hires with the same approach (table 7 for the year 
2006
12) it emerges that firms reporting high demand levels are more likely to hire 
workers (both on temporary and permanent basis). The share of those reporting an 
increasing trend in working hours is generally higher for firms showing propensity to 
hire (both kinds of contract). Those having faced less obstacles in increasing the 
level of production are more likely to hire temporary workers. Again, the existence of 
a positive correlation between firms that show propensity to invest and those with a 
propensity to hire seems to be confirmed by the data.  
Interestingly, Caggese and Cunat (2008) estimate that the existence of liquidity 
constraints should promote a more intense use of temporary contracts; in Table 7 
this phenomenon does not seem to emerge, however the econometric model in 
section 6 will address the point more precisely. 
                                                  
11 Statistics referred to the other years are not very different and are available upon request from the authors. 16 
 
In the next section, we set out a model aiming at disentangling confounding 
factors and actual relationships among the four factors of production considered. 
The descriptive evidence presented here provides a guideline in selecting the most 
relevant controls to be introduced in the econometric model.  
Before doing so, we pause briefly to analyse promotions. Promotions are a 
source of increase in the number of permanent workers alongside permanent hires. 
They will not be included in the model, as they can be observed only since 2009. 
However they are worth an in depth - although short - discussion, as the survey we 
use is a rare example of direct observation of this kind of decision alongside several 
other firm characteristics. 
 
4.2 Promotions 
Probit estimates of the probability of transforming temporary contracts into 
permanent ones, conditional on firm characteristics referred to the preceding year 
are shown in table 8, with reference to the year 2009. Firms that transform a 
temporary contract into a permanent one are on average of a larger size; for a given 
size such probability increases when the competitive position improves and it 
decreases when average labour cost increases by more than 3%. 
Observing the same phenomenon from a different point of view, we can also 
consider the origin of individuals hired with a permanent contract by a given firm. 
Firms are asked to report whether all, some or none of the workers hired in the year 
were unemployed, were employed in a different firm with an open ended contract, 
and so on, as listed in Table 9. The most frequent origin is unemployment, followed 
by a job to job move from a permanent contract in a different firm; third, a promotion 
as above discussed. Other modalities are more and more unlikely.  
                                                                                                                                             
12 Statistics referred to the other years are not very different and are available upon request from the authors. 17 
 
5.  The model and the empirical strategy 
We aim at affirming or denying that innovative investments are accompanied 
by a specific kind of workforce, being it stable or flexible or – as Storey et al (2002) 
discuss – of both kinds (although employed in different occupations). We are also 
interested in estimating the effect of different firm characteristics on investment and 
hiring decisions.  
The aim of this work is an empirical investigation; to solve a structural model 
goes beyond its scope. We will nevertheless refer loosely to a model that takes into 
account the joint dependence of (different kinds of) capital and labour adjustments 
toward an optimal level. We refer to a standard model of profit maximization subject 
to technology constraints and non convex costs arising when adjusting the level of 
inputs. Profits depend – ceteris paribus - on inputs’ productivity, i.e. on the degree of 
innovation embedded in investments and on labour productivity linked to the 
contract used
13. The dynamics of the model follows a so called (S,s) rule, i.e. over 
time an exogenous costless negative drift decreases the level of the four inputs (not 
at the same rate), the drift respectively representing depreciation and 
technical/economic obsolescence for each kind of capital and quits or expiration of 
fixed term contracts for labour
14. The negative drift affecting the production inputs 
decreases total output (Q) over time. When current output Q is “too far away” from 
its desired level (call it Q*) the firm adjusts one or more inputs, hiring and/or 
investing. “Too far away” means that adjustment costs have become lower than lost 
profit due to the output gap Q*-Q. Hence, the probability of adjustment of each factor 
depends on Q*-Q and on the size of its adjustment cost. Abel and Eberly (1998) 
                                                  
13 E.g. permanent workers enjoy higher investment in firm specific human capital, as empirical analysis seems to 
confirm (de Graaf-Zijl, 2006).    18 
prove that the difference between the level of output that triggers adjustment (Q’) 
and the target level of output (Q*) is an increasing function of the amount of 
adjustment costs. This setup holds exactly when modelling the dynamics of a single 
production factor (see Caballero, 1999). Abel and Eberly (1998) model a two-factor 
production function with fixed adjustment costs on one factor only. They show that 
“when factors of production can be adjusted at no cost, the mix of factors can be 
considered separately from their scale. When investment is irreversible and subject 
to a fixed cost, the quasi-fixity of capital eliminates the dichotomy between factor mix 
and scale and it can give rise to labour hoarding, even when labour is a purely 
flexible factor”. In other words, adjustment costs generate an “optimal” correlation 
between the adjustment decisions of all factors of production. Extending their result 
to our four-factor framework - and approximating a formal solution that goes beyond 
the scope of the present work - we consider that the size of adjustment costs of 
each factor generates the sequence of decisions embedded in our recursive model. 
In Abel and Eberly (1998) capital is adjusted at longer intervals, while - conditional 
on investment decisions - labour is adjusted at a higher frequency. In our model we 
have innovative and substitution capital, permanent and temporary labour; we now 
turn to discuss the costs faced by the firm when modifying the level of each of the 
four inputs, and hence the sequence of adjustment decisions.  
All production factors show inaction in our data, hence they all face non-convex 
adjustment costs. While the literature reports empirical evidence of small firing costs 
involving temporary contracts, and of substantial firing costs in adjusting the level of 
                                                                                                                                             
14 On top of the exogenous and costless negative drift there can be an endogenous/costly negative adjustment 
(firings) triggered by hitting the upper threshold of the (S,s) band. These lumpy events are unobservable to 
us, and are de facto included in the error term. To grasp their eventual impact we compare estimates 
referred to different phases of the business cycle, expecting layoffs to be more common during the crisis 
than in previous years. 19 
permanent employees in continental Europe
15, little evidence exists on hiring costs. 
However, Pacelli (2001) provides evidence also on hiring costs referred to Italian 
firms, confirming the high cost of searching and training permanent employees, a 
cost that does not emerge for temporary ones. On the basis of the evidence of high 
adjustment costs referred to permanent labour contracts, we impose the following 
sequence of decisions, where permanent hiring precedes substitution investment:  
⎯ innovative capital: highest adjustment costs, e.g. due to R&D, patents, 
search for the appropriate equipment; 
⎯ permanent labour: high adjustment costs, e.g. due to search, training, 
investment in human capital; 
⎯  substitution capital: low adjustment costs, e.g. due to production disruption 
when installed; 
⎯  temporary labour: lowest adjustment costs, e.g. due to (little) search and 
training. 
Interactions among the different decisions are captured by including 
sequentially the decisions on the more “rigid” production factors into the equations 
estimating the decisions about the more flexible ones; in other words, decisions on 
innovative investment will not depend on the adjustment of other production factors, 
whilst permanent hiring will also depend upon innovative investments; in turn, 
substitution investment will also depend on permanent hiring and finally temporary 
hiring, being the last decision to be made by the firm, will depend upon the decisions 
                                                  
15 Goux, Maurin and Pauchet (2001) estimate - in a convex adjustment cost framework - substantial costs to adjust 
the level of permanent contract workers in France; on the contrary they cannot find significant costs involved 
in adjusting the number of temporary contract workers. Aguirregabiria et Alonso-Borrego (1999) - in a linear 
adjustment cost framework - estimate that firing costs are between one third and half of the gross annual 
wage of permanent workers in Spain. They impose that hiring is made only with temporary contracts and 
estimate that hiring costs are about 15% of the gross annual wage of temporary workers. Rota (2001) 
estimates a labour demand model with fixed and linear adjustment costs with Italian data; she finds that fixed 
costs are substantial, around 40% of annual wage costs, and linear costs are much less important (3.6% of 
annual wage costs). 20 
that the firm has made on all the three more “rigid” production factors considered in 
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I.e. at the beginning of every year, at instant-one the firm decides on Iinnov, at 
instant-two on Hperm, and so on; then production starts. As anticipated in section 3, 
we use a yes/no kind of information on the adjustment of each input, as quantitative 
measures are particularly subject to non response biases and to measurement 
errors. The X matrixes include predetermined observable firm characteristics 
capturing the Q*-Q gap at the end of year t-1, i.e. they include several measures of 
demand at the firm level and of the production process characteristics registered at 
the end of the year preceding the investment/hiring decisions. Hence, our non linear 
recursive equation system (estimated according to Roodman, 2009) estimates the 
impact of adjustment decisions of the more rigid production factors on the 
adjustment of less rigid ones (the α coefficients) as well as the impact of the 
covariates (the β coefficients).  
All the errors are assumed to be identically and independently jointly normally 
distributed with an unrestricted covariance matrix Σ, to be estimated. Off diagonal 
                                                  
16 The model is not dynamic, as no panel data can be used to estimate it due to high attrition, as discussed in 
section 3.3. 21 
elements of Σ measure the covariance (ρij) among errors in different equations of the 
system and, when they are significantly different from zero, they signal endogeneity, 
i.e. they signal that unobserved firm-specific characteristics contribute to the 
decision on the adjustment of more than one input.  
As long as unobservable firm effects are correlated to right-hand–side 
variables only through this channel, i.e. only inputs can be correlated to errors while 
predetermined X are not, then our estimates can take adequate care of 
unobservables. However, the causal interpretation of the α coefficients hinges on 
the specification of the model and cannot be pushed too far, as there might be 
persistence in decisions and in firm characteristics that goes beyond our control. In 
any case in the worst scenario we can measure the conditional increase in the 
probability of a permanent hiring when the firm invests in innovative equipment; or 
the conditional increase in the probability of a temporary hiring when the firm invests 
in innovative equipment and hires permanent workers, and so on. The next section 
discusses the specification and the results. 
 
6. Results 
We estimate the non linear recursive equation system (1)-(2) discussed in the 
previous section. The controls included in the model are measures of demand, 
production and costs at the firm level. The empirical specification needs to be 
parsimonious, as the model is highly non linear and very demanding on data. Hence 
the controls included in the specification have to be a subset of those displayed in 
Table 6 and Table 7. On the other hand, the different measures available as proxies 
of the same element (e.g. demand) show a high degree of correlation, so we could 
safely chose a few of them to represent them all. Furthermore, in the specification of 
Iinnov equation we include the (log of the) amount of total investment per employee in 
t-1 as a proxy of the firm’s general propensity to invest. 22 
The results are presented in Table 10, separately for the five years from 2006 
to 2010. Most importantly, it emerges a positive increase of permanent hires when 
innovative investment are performed; the increase is statistically significant in all 
years up to 2008 - when the crisis hits. Since 2008 we estimate a positive increase 
in temporary hires, instead, when innovative investments are in place. A possible 
explanation points to a cyclical element in this pattern: in upturns investments in 
physical and human capital go together, consistently with the human resources 
literature discussed in section 2. In (sharp) downturns it emerges a cost saving 
strategy adopted by firms that are still able to innovate (only about 12% of the total, 
as shown in Table 1), i.e. they hire but using a cheaper contract. This strategy is 
viable because firms may expect workers to be committed to the firm even if they 
are hired on a temporary base, being the labour market so loose and alternative job 
offers very rare. In this sense the current crisis is more likely to represent an 
exception to the rule linking innovative investment and a stable workforce dealing 
with them. However, to be more definite on this statement we will need to observe 
the development of this pattern –and of promotion rates - not only in the aftermath of 
the crisis (up to December 2010) but also later on.  
Hires of permanent workers do not modify the probability to hire with temporary 
contracts, neither positively nor negatively. This seems coherent with the above 
statement, where firms seem to match innovative investment either with permanent 
hiring or with temporary ones, but not both
17 and also with descriptive evidence 
pointing to firms hiring mostly with one kind of contract (Table 3). On the other hand, 
decisions to invest in substitution and innovative capital are constantly positively 
correlated. Finally, permanent hires trigger substitution investment, although not in 
the whole period considered. 
                                                  
17 The only significant coefficient “alpha-5” in Table 10 (permanent hiring in the equation of flexible hiring) has a p-
value of 0.096 and it is referred to 2008, the “transition year” in which innovative investment are positively 
correlated to both kinds of hiring. 23 
Turning to the impact of controls on investment and hiring decisions, several 
interesting patterns emerge. The probability of making innovative investments is 
lower for non-exporting firms, that are usually smaller and facing a lower degree of 
competition on the product market. On the contrary it is higher for firms not facing 
liquidity constraints, i.e. for firms that can easily finance investment. Persistence of 
investment is confirmed by the positive impact of (the log of) euro invested per 
employees in the previous year on the probability of making innovative investment.  
In turns, permanent hires depend on the level of demand, and increase when 
demand is high. They never depend on increases in labour costs, though. The 
existence of liquidity constraints should promote a more intense use of temporary 
contracts, according to Caggese and Cunat (2008). In fact we find that the presence 
of liquidity constraints decreases permanent hires. However, we find that it 
decreases temporary hires too, hinting to a more general difficulty in financing the 
expansion of the workforce, than to a change in the workforce mix. 
Substitution investment increases when labour cost increases, maybe in an 
attempt to increase labour productivity through a more efficient capital equipment 
(however, the effect is significant only before the crisis). It is interesting to notice that 
the price of labour does not impact on hires of any kind. As anticipated above, 
flexible hiring is decreased by the existence of liquidity constraints; and it is triggered 
by inventories below normal, but only in 2006.  
Finally, there is mixed support for endogeneity, also due to the not very high 
precision of the estimates. Covariance coefficients (ρij) are significant at 10% level 
when involving substitution investment; they are significant at 15% level when 
involving innovative investment, although in selected years only (see the Appendix). 
However, precision of estimates is a recurrent problem in this work, due to the high 
demand on data to identify the model and due to the mostly qualitative nature of the 24 




Existing literature usually analyses firms’ decision on the use of production 
factors looking separately at the choice among temporary and permanent contracts 
and at innovative or substitution investment decisions. In this paper, we have tried to 
shed some light on possible complementarities between different kinds of 
investments (more or less innovative) and different kinds of labour contracts (more 
or less flexible) at the firm level. In doing so, we have exploited the informative 
content of two special sections of the ISAE/ISTAT survey on manufacturing firms, 
respectively concentrating on investment activity and  hiring strategy. In particular, 
we have estimated a model in which decisions about the use of production factors 
(capital and labour) are taken sequentially, starting from the most “rigid” factors 
(innovative investments, permanent hiring) to the more flexible ones (substitution 
investments, temporary hiring); we allow for endogeneity of sequential decisions 
estimating a non linear recursive equation system.  
To start with, innovative investments (the first choice to be made by the firms) 
result to be positively linked to the historical propensity of the firm to invest (captured 
by the investment/employment ratio), to its degree of openness to international 
markets (captured by his status as an exporting firm) and to more cyclical factors 
(financial constraints).  
The hypothesis that decisions on the most “rigid” factors do complement each 
other is also confirmed by the data: the probability of permanent hiring is indeed 
higher for innovative firms; in turns, more innovative firms – that are also hiring on a 
permanent basis – are also more likely to make non-innovative (i.e., substitution) 
investments and to hire on a flexible basis. To sum up, the fact that the firm is 25 
“innovative” (in the sense of making innovative investments) results to have a 
pervasive positive influence both on his propensity to make substitution investments 
and to hire both on a flexible and permanent basis.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a cyclical pattern emerges: the positive 
correlation between innovative investment and permanent hiring is statistically 
significant up to 2008, whilst innovative investments are positively and significantly 
correlated to temporary hiring since 2008. A possible interpretation is that in upturns 
investment in physical and human capital go together, while in downturns it emerges 
a cost saving strategy adopted by firms still able to innovate, strategy that is viable 
because the labour market is very loose and hence workers are likely to be 
committed to the firm even if hired with a temporary contract. In this sense it will be 
important to measure whether the promotion rate will be affected by this pattern in 
the next years. In general, to be more definite on this statement we will need to wait 
for the development of this hiring pattern not only in the aftermath of the crisis that 
we are still experiencing (our last data point is very up to date, being December 
2010) but also later on.  26 
References 
Abel A.B., J.C. Eberly (1994), A unified model of investment under uncertainty, 
American Economic Review 84, 1369-1384. 
Abel A.B., J.C. Eberly (1998), "The mix and scale of factors with irreversibility and 
fixed costs of investment," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 101-135, June. 
Acharya, V., R. Baghai and K. Subramanian (2010a), “Wrongful Discharge Laws 
and Innovation," working paper, New York University Stern School of Business.  
Acharya, V., R. Baghai and K. Subramanian (2010b), “Labour Laws and Innovation," 
Working paper, New York University Stern School of Business.  
Acharya, V., S. Myers and R. G. Rajan (2010c) “The Internal Governance of Firms, " 
Journal of Finance, forthcoming.  
Aguirregabiria V. and C. Alonso-Borrego (1999). ‘Labour contracts and flexibility: 
evidence from a labour market reform in Spain’, manuscript.  
Bassanetti A., Dopke J., Torrini R., Zizza R. (2006), “Capital, labour and productivity: 
What role do they play in the potential GDP weakeness of France, Germany 
and Italy?”, Deutsche Bundesbank, Discussion Paper, Series1: Economic 
Studies, n. 9 
Boeri T. e P. Garibaldi (2007), Two Tier Reforms of Employment Protection. A 
Honeymoon Effect? Economic Journal, vol. 117, n. 521, pp. 357-85. 
Brandolini A., M. Bugamelli (2009), Report on trends in the Italian productive 
system, Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 45, Bank of 
Italy, Economic Research Department.  
Caballero R.J. (1999), Aggregate Investment, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford 
(ed.) Handbook of Macroeconomics, , chapter 12, pages 813-862, 1999. 
Caggese A., Cunat V. (2008), “Financing Constraints and Fixed Term Employment 
Contracts”, Economic Journal, vol. 118, issue 533, pages 2013-2046 27 
Cipollone P., Guelfi A. (2006), “The Value of Flexible Contracts: Evidence from an 
Italian Panel of Industrial Firms”, Banca d’Italia, Temi di discussione, n. 583. 
Costantini M., de Nardis S., Mancini M. (2007), “Modifiche istituzionali e 
trasformazioni strutturali nel mercato del lavoro italiano” in L’Italia 
nell’integrazione europea, Rapporto ISAE, march. 
Daveri F., M.L. Parisi (2010), Experience, Innovation and Productivity: Empirical 
evidence from Ital’s slow-down, paper presented at the Aix-en-Provence 
Conference on “Firms, Trade and Development” and at the OECD-CESifo 
conference “Regulation: Political Economy, Measurement and Effects on 
Performance”, Munich, pp. 1-23 
De Nardis S. (2007), Ristrutturazione industriale italiana nei primi anni 2000: 
occupazione, specializzazione, imprese, in ISAE, Trasformazioni dell’Industria 
Italiana, Quaderni di discussione, December, pp. 7-52  
De Nardis S., C. Pappalardo e C. Vicarelli (2008), The Euro Adoption’s Impact on 
Extensive and Intensive Margins of Trade: The Italian Case, ISAE Working 
Paper, n. 101. 
De Graaf-zijl, M. (2006). Economic and social consequences of temporary 
employment (PhD thesis) 
Del Boca A. and P. Rota (1998). ‘How much does hiring and firing cost? Survey 
evidence from a sample of Italian firms’, Labour vol. 12, pp. 427-449.  
Dew Becker I. e R.J. Gordon (2008), The Role of Labor Market Changes in the 
Slowdown of European Productivity Growth, NBER Working Paper, n.13982. 
Goux D.E. Maurin and M. Pauchet (2001), Fixed-Term Contracts and the Dynamics 
of Labour Demand, European Economic Review, 2001, vol. 45, no 3, p. 533-
552  28 
Hailey, V., 2001, “Breaking the mould? Innovation as a strategy for corporate 
renewal," The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 12(7), 
1126-1140 
ISAE, (2006), L'inchiesta ISAE sulle assunzioni effettuate dalle imprese nel 2005 e 
le previsioni per il 2006, Nota Mensile n. 3, March  
ISAE (2007), "L'inchiesta ISAE sulle assunzioni effettuate dalle imprese nel 2006 e 
le previsioni per il 2007, Nota Mensile, n. 2, February 
ISAE (2008), Il mercato del lavoro italiano nel 2007 tra risultati positivi e l'emergere 
di alcune criticità, Nota Mensile, n. 3, March 
ISAE (2009), "Le  assunzioni nel 2008 nel settore manifatturiero: tipologie 
contrattuali, contrattazione integrativa, skills", Nota Mensile n. 4, April 
ISAE (2010), La domanda di lavoro in tempi di recessione: posti vacanti e 
assunzioni nel settore manifatturiero, Nota Mensile n. 4, April.   
Lucidi F. (2006), Is There a Trade-Off between Labour Flexibility and Productivity 
Growth? Preliminary Evidence from Italian Firms, paper presentato al XXI 
Convegno Nazionale di Economia del Lavoro, 14-15 Settembre, Udine. 
MacLeod, W., and V. Nakavachara, (2007), “Can Wrongful Discharge Law Enhance 
Employment?" The Economic Journal, 117, F218-F278. 
Mancini M. (2007), “Regimi di protezione all’impiego ed effetti sul mercato del 
lavoro: l’evoluzione della flessibilità in Italia”, I Temi dei Rapporti ISAE, June 
Michie J. e M. Sheehan (2003), Labour Market Deregulation, ‘Flexibility’ and 
Innovation, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 27, n. 1, pp. 123-43. 
Pacelli L. (2001): "Fixed Term Contracts, Social Security Rebates and Labour 
Demand in Italy", Progetto MIUR "Occupazione e disoccupazione in Italia: 
misura ed analisi dei comportamenti", Working Paper n. 36, Padova, 
Dipartimento di Scienze Statistiche, Università di Padova. 29 
Parisi M.L., F. Schiantarelli e A. Sembenelli (2006), Productivity, Innovation and 
R&D: Micro Evidence for Italy, European Economic Review, vol. 50, n. 8, pp. 
2037-061. 
Pianta M. e A. Vaona (2007), Innovation and Productivity in European Industries, 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, vol. 16, n. 7, pp. 485-99 
Roodman D. (2009), Estimating Fully Observed Recursive Mixed-Process Models 
with cmp, CGD Working Paper 168. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global 
Development.  
Rota P. (2001). ‘Dynamic Labour Demand with Lumpy and Kinked Adjustment 
Costs’, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Nota di Lavoro no. 20 
Storey J., Quintas P., Taylor P., Fowle W. (2002), “Flexible employment contracts 
and their implications for product and process innovation," The International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 13(1), 1-18. 30 
 
Table 1 Investment by kind of expenditure, years 2006-2010 
 
YEAR 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010
% all % of I % all % of I % all % of I % all % of I % all % of I
no Investment 45.1 50.3 45.6 56.3 58.4
substitution 27.9 50.7 25.7 58.9 35.6 81.4 31.1 71.1 29.4 70.6
sub-total: no I + subst 72.9 76.1 81.0 87.4 87.8
substitution and process innovation 12.7 23.1 8.5 19.5 5.4 12.3 3.8 8.8 3.3 8.0
process innovation 7.4 13.4 8.1 18.4 5.7 13.1 4.9 11.2 4.5 10.8
substitution and product innovation 0.7 1.3 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.7 1.7
product innovation 0.9 1.5 0.8 1.8 1.3 2.9 1.7 3.8 1.4 3.3
process and product innovation 1.9 3.5 1.3 3.0 0.7 1.6 0.7 1.5 1.1 2.7
substitution, process and product inn. 3.5 6.4 4.2 9.6 2.2 4.9 1.1 2.5 1.2 2.9  
 
Note. Column percentages. 
“% all”: share of firms by kind of investment;  





Table 2 Investment at the firm level (2006 and 2010) 
 
Investment in t No Yes No Yes
No 73.5 19.7 78.4 40.8
Yes 26.5 80.3 21.6 59.2
Substitution 54.2 48.3 76.9 68.2
Innovative 26.0 16.4 14.5 17.6










Table 3 Hiring by type of contract 
 
Type of contract 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010
% all % all H % all % all H % all % all H % all % all H % all % all H
no hiring 68.1 71.4 70.8 79.7 77.0
only open ended 12.0 37.7 13.5 47.3 12.9 44.1 8.2 40.4 7.3 31.7
only fixed term 10.5 33.0 7.8 27.3 8.1 27.7 8.1 39.9 9.4 40.9
only training 3.4 10.6 2.4 8.3 2.0 6.9 1.1 5.5 2.0 8.7
only agency n.a. n.a. 1.1 3.9 1.2 4.1 0.8 4.1 1.0 4.5
Open ended and fixed term 3.3 10.5 1.4 5.0 1.9 6.5 0.7 3.4 1.0 4.2
Open ended and training 0.8 2.7 0.5 1.8 0.8 2.7 0.1 0.5 0.4 1.8
Fixed term and training 0.8 2.4 0.4 1.4 0.6 2.0 0.3 1.6 0.1 0.4
Other combinations 1.1 3.1 1.5 5.0 1.7 6.0 1.0 4.6 1.8 7.8  
 
Note.  Column percentages 
“% all”: share of firms by kind of hiring contract;  






Table 4: sample size after the merge  
 
dataset /year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
investment (year t) 2896 2918 3048 3829 3870
labour market (year t) 3816 3701 3704 3816 3887
investment + labour market 2700 2473 2810 3661 3616
monthly survey (year t-1) 3726 3707 3572 3591 3825
invest. + labour m. + monthly survey 2272 2130 2434 3187 3143
% potential sample 78.5 73.0 79.9 83.2 81.2  
 










Table 5 Hiring and investment at the firm level (2006 and 2010) 
 
2006
Hiring No investments Substitution Innovative Both Total
No Hiring 32.3 18.9 6.8 9.5 67.5
Permanent 5.1 4.7 1.7 3.2 14.8
Temporary 4.9 3.5 1.6 2.9 12.9
Both 1.4 1.0 0.6 1.9 4.8
Total 43.7 28.1 10.7 17.5 100.0
2010
Hiring No investments Substitution Innovative Both Total
No Hiring 47.5 21.5 5.1 2.9 77.0
Permanent 6.6 4.5 1.0 1.2 13.3
Temporary 3.6 2.3 0.7 0.7 7.3
Both 0.8 1.0 0.1 0.5 2.4





Note. Percentages of firms in each cell. Weighted statistics. 
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Table 6: Investment in year t and firm status in year t-1 – year 2006 
 
investment
no subst innov both
DEMAND
competitive position up share 0.062 0.100 0.128 0.115
down share 0.098 0.067 0.078 0.099
demand high share 0.121 0.181 0.154 0.166
low share 0.304 0.310 0.228 0.287
export no share 0.725 0.674 0.641 0.552
PRODUCTION
plant utilization average % 69.695 71.706 73.784 74.092
worked hours up share 0.085 0.138 0.136 0.139
down share 0.165 0.146 0.126 0.177
obstacles yes share 0.463 0.490 0.386 0.472
liquidity constraints yes share 0.147 0.167 0.100 0.132
no share 0.234 0.291 0.365 0.348
production low share 0.286 0.265 0.205 0.271
inventories high share 0.095 0.082 0.156 0.142
low share 0.089 0.107 0.114 0.103
COST
CMeLup3 share 0.094 0.135 0.090 0.163
FACTORS
H temp share 0.151 0.203 0.223 0.294
H perm share 0.146 0.163 0.210 0.278
I/L mean (000) 4.788 3.545 7.815 9.769
number of firms share 0.434 0.282 0.107 0.178  
 
Note.  Share of firms by kind of investment.  













Table 7: Hiring in year t and firm status in year t-1 – year 2006 
 
hiring
no temp perm both
DEMAND
competitive position up share 0.072 0.141 0.127 0.067
down share 0.094 0.051 0.108 0.054
demand high share 0.146 0.121 0.182 0.196
low share 0.306 0.257 0.302 0.230
export no share 0.688 0.624 0.671 0.585
PRODUCTION
plant utilization average % 70.978 73.144 71.147 74.266
worked hours up share 0.088 0.175 0.168 0.161
down share 0.150 0.188 0.142 0.215
obstacles yes share 0.479 0.359 0.510 0.456
liquidity constraints yes share 0.154 0.107 0.163 0.088
no share 0.269 0.326 0.286 0.362
production low share 0.287 0.252 0.217 0.201
inventories high share 0.091 0.133 0.144 0.122
low share 0.083 0.140 0.126 0.122
COST
CMeLup3 share 0.108 0.152 0.116 0.135
FACTORS
I inno share 0.243 0.337 0.351 0.519
I sost share 0.424 0.538 0.504 0.588
I/L mean (000) 5.102 4.945 8.187 8.334
number of firms share 0.670 0.148 0.131 0.050  
 
 
Note.  Share of firms by kind of hiring.  










Table 8: Transformation of temporary contracts into permanent ones 
 
dy/dx Coef. Std. Err. P>z
ln Employee 0.075 0.246 0.067 0.000
Labour cost>3% -0.132 -0.475 0.284 0.095
Competitive position_up 0.265 0.737 0.387 0.057














From open ended contract 2.37
Promotion of atypical or freelance 2.52
First job 2.56
From non-open ended contract 2.69
From mobility lists 2.73
From the same firm (agency workers)  2.75  
 
Note. Weighted statistics. 
(*) Average of answers:  
1=all hires have been from ...,  
2=some hires have been from ..., 
3=no hires have been from ..., 
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Table 10: Hiring and Investments at the firm level, mixed-process regression 
 
2 0 0 62 0 0 72 0 0 82 0 0 92 0 1 0
Innovative Investment
No Export -0.282 -0.124 -0.527 -0.254 -0.224
Liquidity constraints: no 0.208 0.129 0.176 0.347 0.359
Inventories above normal 0.337 0.047 0.196 0.303 0.064
(Inv/Empl)t-1 0.311 0.394 0.250 0.230 0.255
C  -0.754 -0.918 -0.907 -1.268 -1.255
Permanent Hirings
Innovative Investments 0.758 0.363 0.521 0.498 0.222
Demand: high 0.210 0.063 0.255 0.338 0.254
Increase Labour cost> 3% -0.002 0.038 0.011 0.170 0.153
Liquidity constraints: yes 0.045 -0.282 -0.312 -0.094 -0.236
C -1.175 -1.066 -1.056 -1.421 -1.278
Substitution Investment
Permanent Hirings 0.774 1.404 1.350 0.786 1.207
Innovative Investments 0.538 1.086 0.713 0.644 0.592
Increase Labour cost> 3% 0.293 0.198 0.169 -0.021 0.038
C -0.431 -0.739 -0.469 -0.467 -0.584
Flexible hirings
Substitution Investment -0.046 0.676 -0.429 -0.503 -0.831
Permanent Hirings 0.461 -0.684 0.979 1.039 0.158
Innovative Investments 0.463 0.597 0.956 0.874 0.624
Liquidity constraints: yes -0.223 -0.267 -0.074 -0.064 -0.065
Inventories below normal 0.264 -0.048 0.147 0.128 -0.100
Increase Labour cost> 3% 0.234 -0.058 0.028 -0.036 0.199
C -1.082 -1.256 -1.023 -1.113 -0.610
ρ1,2 -0.289 0.041 -0.094 -0.144 0.128
ρ1,3 -0.041 -0.549 -0.455 -0.271 -0.276
ρ1,4 -0.139 -0.202 -0.401 -0.270 -0.151
ρ2,3 -0.355 -0.731 -0.560 -0.267 -0.507
ρ2,4 -0.095 0.350 -0.397 -0.487 0.144
ρ3,4 0.165 -0.253 0.455 0.500 0.674  
 




  Appendix : Complete estimated results 
  
year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
Innovative Investment
No Export -0.282 0.094 -2.980 0.003 -0.124 0.092 -1.350 0.176 -0.527 0.091 -5.800 0.000 -0.254 0.093 -2.740 0.006 -0.224 0.107 -2.090 0.036
Liquidity constraints: no 0.208 0.098 2.110 0.035 0.129 0.103 1.250 0.212 0.176 0.089 1.970 0.048 0.347 0.101 3.450 0.001 0.359 0.113 3.190 0.001
Inventories above normal 0.337 0.141 2.390 0.017 0.047 0.155 0.300 0.761 0.196 0.143 1.370 0.171 0.303 0.119 2.550 0.011 0.064 0.153 0.420 0.677
(Inv/Empl)t-1 0.311 0.042 7.360 0.000 0.394 0.041 9.670 0.000 0.250 0.033 7.630 0.000 0.230 0.030 7.690 0.000 0.255 0.041 6.200 0.000
C  -0.754 0.083 -9.120 0.000 -0.918 0.088 -10.400 0.000 -0.907 0.090 -10.120 0.000 -1.268 0.084 -15.120 0.000 -1.255 0.090 -13.960 0.000
Permanent Hirings
Innovative Investments 0.758 0.272 2.780 0.005 0.363 0.197 1.840 0.066 0.521 0.237 2.200 0.028 0.498 0.653 0.760 0.446 0.222 0.273 0.810 0.417
Demand: high 0.210 0.122 1.720 0.086 0.063 0.120 0.530 0.597 0.255 0.126 2.030 0.042 0.338 0.175 1.930 0.053 0.254 0.151 1.680 0.093
Increase Labour cost> 3% -0.002 0.141 -0.010 0.990 0.038 0.122 0.310 0.754 0.011 0.129 0.090 0.932 0.170 0.113 1.510 0.130 0.153 0.127 1.200 0.231
Liquidity constraints: yes 0.045 0.146 0.310 0.758 -0.282 0.139 -2.030 0.042 -0.312 0.120 -2.590 0.010 -0.094 0.102 -0.920 0.358 -0.236 0.113 -2.090 0.036
C -1.175 0.083 -14.150 0.000 -1.066 0.074 -14.340 0.000 -1.056 0.066 -15.980 0.000 -1.421 0.084 -16.890 0.000 -1.278 0.079 -16.200 0.000
Substitution Investment
Permanent Hirings 0.774 0.898 0.860 0.389 1.404 0.226 6.200 0.000 1.350 0.513 2.630 0.008 0.786 0.527 1.490 0.135 1.207 0.309 3.910 0.000
Innovative Investments 0.538 0.311 1.730 0.084 1.086 0.231 4.710 0.000 0.713 0.392 1.820 0.069 0.644 0.299 2.150 0.031 0.592 0.235 2.520 0.012
Increase Labour cost> 3% 0.293 0.136 2.160 0.031 0.198 0.094 2.100 0.036 0.169 0.107 1.590 0.113 -0.021 0.092 -0.220 0.823 0.038 0.126 0.300 0.763
C -0.431 0.118 -3.660 0.000 -0.739 0.055 -13.500 0.000 -0.469 0.065 -7.190 0.000 -0.467 0.060 -7.760 0.000 -0.584 0.051 -11.430 0.000
Flexible hirings
Substitution Investment -0.046 0.730 -0.060 0.950 0.676 0.459 1.470 0.141 -0.429 0.370 -1.160 0.245 -0.503 1.222 -0.410 0.681 -0.831 0.409 -2.030 0.042
Permanent Hirings 0.461 0.979 0.470 0.638 -0.684 0.795 -0.860 0.389 0.979 0.588 1.660 0.096 1.039 0.932 1.110 0.265 0.158 0.556 0.280 0.777
Innovative Investments 0.463 0.395 1.170 0.241 0.597 0.365 1.640 0.102 0.956 0.314 3.050 0.002 0.874 0.278 3.150 0.002 0.624 0.288 2.170 0.030
Liquidity constraints: yes -0.223 0.128 -1.740 0.082 -0.267 0.160 -1.680 0.094 -0.074 0.129 -0.580 0.565 -0.064 0.091 -0.700 0.487 -0.065 0.088 -0.740 0.456
Inventories below normal 0.264 0.160 1.660 0.098 -0.048 0.154 -0.320 0.753 0.147 0.139 1.060 0.290 0.128 0.126 1.020 0.307 -0.100 0.155 -0.650 0.518
Increase Labour cost> 3% 0.234 0.156 1.500 0.135 -0.058 0.132 -0.440 0.660 0.028 0.112 0.250 0.804 -0.036 0.103 -0.350 0.724 0.199 0.138 1.440 0.149
C -1.082 0.285 -3.790 0.000 -1.256 0.175 -7.170 0.000 -1.023 0.199 -5.150 0.000 -1.113 0.750 -1.480 0.138 -0.610 0.310 -1.970 0.049
/atanhrho_12 -0.298 0.193 -1.550 0.122 0.041 0.123 0.340 0.736 -0.094 0.123 -0.760 0.444 -0.145 0.372 -0.390 0.697 0.128 0.159 0.800 0.421
/atanhrho_13 -0.041 0.168 -0.250 0.806 -0.617 0.196 -3.140 0.002 -0.491 0.275 -1.790 0.074 -0.278 0.183 -1.520 0.129 -0.283 0.152 -1.870 0.062
/atanhrho_14 -0.140 0.218 -0.640 0.520 -0.205 0.216 -0.950 0.343 -0.425 0.204 -2.080 0.037 -0.277 0.185 -1.500 0.135 -0.153 0.162 -0.940 0.348
/atanhrho_23 -0.371 0.577 -0.640 0.520 -0.932 0.290 -3.210 0.001 -0.633 0.494 -1.280 0.200 -0.273 0.268 -1.020 0.308 -0.559 0.207 -2.690 0.007
/atanhrho_24 -0.095 0.540 -0.180 0.860 0.365 0.491 0.740 0.457 -0.420 0.349 -1.200 0.229 -0.532 0.478 -1.110 0.266 0.145 0.324 0.450 0.654
/atanhrho_34 0.167 0.489 0.340 0.733 -0.258 0.435 -0.590 0.553 0.491 0.289 1.700 0.089 0.550 0.980 0.560 0.575 0.819 0.384 2.130 0.033
ρ1,2 -0.289 0.177 0.041 0.123 -0.094 0.122 -0.144 0.365 0.128 0.157
ρ1,3 -0.041 0.168 -0.549 0.137 -0.455 0.218 -0.271 0.170 -0.276 0.140
ρ1,4 -0.139 0.214 -0.202 0.207 -0.401 0.171 -0.270 0.172 -0.151 0.159
ρ2,3 -0.355 0.504 -0.731 0.135 -0.560 0.339 -0.267 0.249 -0.507 0.154
ρ2,4 -0.095 0.535 0.350 0.431 -0.397 0.294 -0.487 0.365 0.144 0.317
ρ3,4 0.165 0.476 -0.253 0.408 0.455 0.229 0.500 0.734 0.674 0.209
Log pseudolikelihood -1036246.100 -914985.130 -890198.850 -780219.400 -726688.840
Number of obs 2260 2104 2383 3147 3103
Wald chi2(4) 75.910 106.120 118.180 97.360 56.940
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
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